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torically- and culturally-grounded consciousness. Especially when 
linked to a broad vision of "constitutional pluralism," which could 
draw upon such diverse sources as the work of Cover and his disci-
ples, some strands in CLS work, the law and literature scholarship, 
and feminist legal criticism, a sharp interpretive turn away from IT 
holds considerable promise. Free from the grasp of IT, writers 
could delve into all of those very human stories about power and 
knowledge, about the reach of social institutions and groups, and 
about the popular needs and aspirations that actually bring into 
play-as works such as John Noonan's Faces & Masks of the Law 
remind us-the specialized rhetoric of constitutional lawyers and 
judges. 
(3) Discussions about "constitutional rhetoric" can be broad-
ened. Why should constitutional historians leave analysis of writers 
such as Herman Melville and the works of mass culture to those in 
the law schools and English departments? There is a wide range of 
supposedly "non-constitutional" sources that can be cross-ex-
amined in light of what can be drawn from historical studies. Here, 
quite obviously, constitutional historians need to go beyond the ob-
vious turn toward "political" histories, long prominent in works 
about IT, and connect the innovative work in cultural and social 
history that has been published in recent years to a broader, more 
pluralistic vision of constitutionalism. 
Of course, the twin moves toward an ABCT and a broader 
view of constitutional history would likely result in the work of his-
torians becoming more marginal than ever to constitutional law tra-
ditionalists, but-given the realities of the current relationship 
between law and history-do constitutional historians really have 
all that much influence to lose? 
The Obligatory Quote From "History": 
"Let us not negotiate from fear; but let us not fear to 
negotiate." 
ROBERT NAGELis 
I am hesitant to make recommendations about directions for 
constitutional law scholarship. In the unlikely event that such sug-
gestions were taken seriously, they might constrict the range of ap-
proaches attempted in our field. One thing we do not need is more 
faddishness. Even if not taken seriously, they might convey an erro-
neous impression that I think my own work is exempt from 
IS. Professor of Law, University of Colorado, Boulder. 
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whatever deficiencies prompt my suggestions for change. Despite 
these risks, I have one general observation to offer. In my opinion, 
constitutional scholarship is becoming excessively theoretical and 
in-grown. Of course, abstraction and erudition have their uses, but 
they also tend to exclude some virtues that have special relevance to 
our field. 
One virtue that is out of fashion partly because of the predomi-
nance of the scholastic style is empathy for the individuals who are 
immediately involved in constitutional decisionmaking. Scholarly 
criticism seldom takes into account the special perspective of those 
with actual responsibilities. Often both our criticisms of the use of 
judicial power and our proposals for its justification assume that 
judges have infinite time and knowledge. Our standards do not take 
much account of the judge's powerful sense that, despite the many 
imperfections in understanding or motivation that are present at the 
moment of decision, some decision must be made. We all know 
that making a real decision in a discrete amount of time is far differ-
ent from reflecting about the decision later, but this recognition sel-
dom affects our criteria or our criticisms. We might profitably 
think more about the differences between the job of being a judge 
and the job of being a professor. 
Similarly, we engage in much talk about justice, public values, 
civic virtue, and so on. Our moral discourse, however, is too sel-
dom influenced by empathetic attention to the consequences of deci-
sions. We might try more frequently to take into consideration the 
immediate circumstances of (for example) the children in schools 
that are being desegregated or of the guards in prisons that are be-
ing restructured. More generally, we often speculate-usually opti-
mistically-about how judicial opinions influence the attitudes and 
understandings of the general public. But much of this speculation 
is based on subtle analysis of what judges have written, without 
much concern for what various publics may have in fact seen or 
heard or understood. 
A second virtue that tends to be excluded by the current em-
phasis on erudition is expressiveness. The Federalist demonstrates, 
if demonstration is required, that sophisticated theory can be made 
understandable and even compelling to wide audiences. Although 
the subject matter of constitutional law is supposedly closely tied to 
our fundamental political traditions and understandings, much of 
modern constitutional scholarship somehow cannot be made intelli-
gible to most lawyers, let alone to most members of the literate pub-
lic. It is one thing for scholars in other fields to impress one another 
with recondite references and stilted jargon, but this sort of speciali-
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zation is especially unfortunate in the field of constitutional law. I 
believe we should try more often to direct even our most sophisti-
cated thinking at wider audiences. 
STANLEY C. BRUBAKERt6 
What needs to be done in constitutional scholarship? I would 
suggest three things. t7 First, the fixation on the judicial perspective 
must be loosened. Courts provide only one of several perspectives 
for viewing the Constitution, and the pretense that it is exclusive 
distorts both the Constitution and the judicial function. If the judi-
cial perspective is to be taken seriously, one must first take the Con-
stitution seriously and determine what it envisages for the judicial 
function; this necessarily requires an inquiry into the history and 
political philosophy from which a distinctive judicial function 
emerged. That is rarely done. Instead the judicial function is de-
rived from some confection of remedies for what, in the mind of the 
commentator, ails America. Detached from the political philoso-
phy in which it emerged, the role of the courts, especially the 
Supreme Court, in the work of constitutional commentators has de-
generated from a cautious and prudent Socratic inquirer in the 
work of Alexander Bickel to a brash Commander in the work of 
Bruce Ackerman.ts 
Once the judicial function is understood with greater attention 
to its philosophic background in a separation of powers theory, 
judges will be recognized as less than omnicompetent for saying 
what the Constitution means. Doctrines such as political questions, 
standing, ripeness, etc., have real meaning and limit the range over 
which courts may speak; and within this range, or at least some 
portion of it, courts should see the Constitution through the special 
lens of "deference." But even where these limits are recognized, 
adherence to the judicial perspective has led to constitutional distor-
tion; from the sound premise that a given subject is not fit for the 
courts to resolve, the erroneous conclusion is drawn that whatever 
the political branches do is right. Several authors have broken from 
this exclusive judicial perspective and have brought fresh insight to 
constitutional scholarship--notably Murphy, Fleming and Harris 
(American Constitutional Interpretation), Brest and Levinson 
16. Associate Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. 
17. In a more moderate tone and at greater length, I address similar concerns in "Our 
Meta Constitution of Self-Government" (Sept. 1987) (paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the American Political Science Association). 
18. In naming names, I am following the suggestion of a famous editor that scholarship 
will be enhanced by a reduction in professional courtesy. Farber, Gresham sLaw of Legal 
Scholarship, 3 CaNST. COMM. 307, 310 (1986). 
